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Usually, one of the assumptions underlying household labor
supply models is that the household's preferences can be represented by
a joint utility or cost Eunction. In this paper an empirical household
labor sypply mudel is developed within the framework of two-person co-
operative game theory, allowing to test the equality of the utility
fi~ncttons of the spouses.
The model is confined to Pareto optimal allocations (solutions).
Fiowever, since the actual allocation in a household will depend on the
relative power oE the spouses we do not explicitly choose one particular
Pareto optimal allocation (such as, for example, Nash bargaining) as the
preferred solution concept. Instead, using data on both actual and pre-
ferred working hours, the Pareto optimal allocation actually chosen by
households is estímated.4
I. lntruiinct liin
Much of [he recent empirical work on labor supply has concentra-
ted on the econometric problems associated with non-participation, non-
linear and non-convex budget sets, rationing and stochastic specifica-
tion. In addition, recognizing the in[erdependence of the labor supply
of the spouses in a household, research is directed towards modelling
male and female labor supply simultaneously (e.g. Blundell and Walker
(1982) and Hausman and Ruud (1984)).
Usually, a maintained assump[ion underlying these models is that
thc household is a homogeneous decísion makng untt, so that it's prefe-
rences can be represented by a joint utility (or cost) funetion.
Although this seems a strong assumption, the literature on empirical
mctdels that nre hased on a more general householri decision making frame-
work is límited.
An important theoretical paper on household decision making is
the paper by Manser and Brown (1980). Placing the household decision
making process in a bargaining framework and applying two-person coope-
rative game theory, these authors discuss a number of Pareto optimal
allocations, including the dictatorial, Nash bargaining and Kalai-
Smorodinsky allocations. Each solution implies a different form for the
labor supply functions. One of the problems in applied work is that it
is not clear which of these solutions should be the basis Eor the empi-
rtcal model. McAlrny and }iorney (1981) concentrate on the theoretical
properties nf household demand itm ctíons hased on Nash bargaininp,. In
c~m~,frtrnl wnrk i~e;lnl; r~~upcr:tllvc };amc~ thc~nry, Na41t h:~rgnlninf~ is usually
ntisume~l, sc~e Iluntey ,cnJ Mch:Lroy (I980) and Hrown and Manser (1978).
A different approach is followed by Ashworth and Ulph (1981) who
estimate a mociel originally proposed by Leuthold (1968). The Leuthold
model asstnnes that each individual in the household maximizes an inde-
pendent utility function, given the labor supply of the partner. Both
partners then adjust their labor supply until their decisions are mutu-
ally consistent. A major difficulty wíth the Leuthold allocation (which
ts in fact a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium) is that it is generally
not Pareto optimal. The same objection applies to the paper by Bjorn and
Vuong (1984), who estimate a labor force participation model employing
non-cooper,t[iv~~ l;ame the~try. AS has been acp,ued by Manser and Brown ít5
(ti more apprupriatc~ tu employ models whtch yield Pareto optimal solu-
tLnn~.
A ci(,;t inctiv~, featnr~ of the model. presented in [hts paper is
the :lose c~unnectiun bctween the neoclassical theory of labor supply,
t;ame theory and econometrtc methods. The model describes the set of
Pareto optimal allocations of male and female leisure and household con-
sumption. The model is estimated using a data set which does not only
contain information on how many hours each partner actually works per
week, but also on how many hours they would like to work. Using this
extra information, it is possible to explain both preferred and actual
working hours, without choosing a priori one particular Pareto optimal
allocation as the preFerred solntton concept. As a matter of fact, the
informatlon rillows us t~ estimate thc~ Pareto optimal allocatton actually
rhosen by hous~holds. Ln addition, it allows us to test the equality of
the utility functions of both spouses.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we give a
discussion of some game theoretic models of household labor supply. In
Section 3 we present our speciEica[ion, and discuss estimation of the
model. Section 4 contains empirical results and Section 5 concludes.6
2. Household decision making: a graphical exposition
We only consider households where both a male and a female part-
ner are pretient. The~ preferences of the i-th (iam,f; m denotes male, f
~Icnotes female) partner can be represented by a well-behaved utility
fruiction Ui(~.~,Rf,y), where Rn Ls male letsure, Rf is female leisure and
y is total household consumptíon. The dic[atorial poin[ D1 e
(Rm ,Rf ,yt) of the i-th par[ner ts defined as the solution of the maxi-
miz.atíon problem:
i
max U (Rm,Rf,y) i - m,f
Rm~Rf.Y
s.t. wmRm t wfRf -F y- Y- wmT t wfT f u (2.2)
where wm and wf are the male and female wage rate, T is total time en-
dowment and u is non-labor incomel); Y is full income.
After eliminating y from (2.l) using the full income constraint (2.2),
the utility functtons can he conveniently represented in the
(Rln'Rf)-
plane; tiee f[};ure 7.1. The solid curves around the dtctatorial point Df
are the indífference curves of the female partner, the dotted curves
around Dm are the indifference curves of the male partner. The farther
an indifference curve is removed from a dictatorial point, the lower is
the utility level corresponding to this curve.
1) The wage rates and non-labor income are all measured after taxes.H i~;,,rP z. l. l)
UsinK fíí;urt: 2.1., we can also easily represent the allocation
implied by the Leuthold model. The rationed (or conditional) leisure
demand equation of the male partner, given the leisure demand of the
female partner (reaction curve), is the line AB in figure 2.1. It con-
nects the tangency points of horizontal lines with the indifference
curves around Dm. Analogously, line CD is the rationed leisure demand
equation of the female partner gíven the leisure demand of the male
partner. Graphically, the Leuthold equilibrium is represented as the
I) I~ig„rc~ 2.1. is b,isc~d on Stone-Geary utility Eunctions ( see Sec[ion
3), with wm-w1-1; y~n-Yf-Yy-~`~m ~Sf-iSy-O; am0.2; af-0.4; Qm~D.4; Qf-0.2.a
poínt of intersection S of the reaction curves AB and CD. Clearly, S is
not Pareto optimal, as both partners can improve by moving from S to,
f~ir c~xample, Pl).
In figure 2.1. we can also clearly visualize the set oE Pareto
optimal allocations (i.e. the contract curve). Obviously, all tangency
points of indifference curves around Dm with indifference curves around
Df, hetween (and íncluding) both dictatorial points, represen[ Pareto








Equatíon (2.3) follows immediately from the first order condí-
tions for maximizing Vi (Rm,Rf,y) subject to V~ (Rm,Rf,y) - V~ (i-m,f;
j-f,m). ALtcrnativt~ly, it can he obtained hy maximizing a convex combi-
na[ion uf Vm and Vf, í.e. by maximizing
V ' (I-a)Vm ~ aVl (2.4)
for a given a (Ocacl)
The contract curve can alsn be characterized using the concept
dow wage set forth in, Eor example, Neary and Roberts (1980).
In terms of Ui (2.3) can be written as
1II~nI~)lÍn
~R- ;}y- - wm
m










1) Neither Leuthold nor Ashworth and Ulph pay attention to the game the-
oretic properties of the equilibrium implied by their model. A thorough
discussion of this kind of equilibrium is provided in Basar and Olsder
(1982).9
The shadow wages w~ (i,j-m,f) at which a partícular poínt on the con-
trac[ curve wou]d he optímal for the i-th partner (i.e. would coincide
with his or her díctatorial point) is defined by
aVi all 2Ui,
wi - 0 a2. - ~R.. - aY l
] .7
or equívalently
-i aUi aUí wi - aRi ay
Ilsin}; (2.7) wc can rc.writc~ (Z.5) as
-m -f
w - w w - w
m m m m
-m - -f
wf - wf wf - wf




gi (wm. wf. u) - gi (wm, wf~ u) i- m,f (2.9)
where gi (wm'wf'}') is the demand equation for Ri of the j-th partner in
thc~ case of dict~torship.
The. charncterizatl~n uf the contract curve in terms of shadow
waKc~s ts particularly ust~Ful in the case whe,re preferences are represen-
ted by a cost function or an iildirec[ utility function and no explicit
form for the corresponding direct utility function is known (as in the
case of, for example, the Almost Ideal Demand System).
Following the arguments in Manser and Brown (1980) we will
impose Pareto optimality of the actual allocatons in our model. Assuming
that partners know each other so well that they cannot hide their true
preferences, the Pareto optimalíty property follows direc[ly from the
a5sumption of utilíty maximizing behavior. An important advantage of the
approach followed ín this paper is that it ts not necessary to choose a
priori one partlcular Pareto optimal allocation, such as Kalai-Smoro-
dinsky, Nash bargaining or male or female dictatorship as the preferred
solution concept. The actual allocation in a household (i.e. the pointlo
on the contract curve) will depend on the relative power of the spouses
in the~ houti~.huld lnbor tiupply decision. if the influence of the male
partnc-r is rel~~tively lar,r~e, the actual allocatton is likely to be close
tu the male dictatorial p~int Dm; if the female influence is relatively
Large, we expect the actual allocation to be close to the female dicta-
torial point Df. We leave the relative influence of the partners as an
empirical matter by estimating a parameter representing the poínt on the
contract curve corresponding with the actual allocation.11
3. Specification oE the model and the estimation method.
As a speclEication for the utility functions ( 2.1) we choose the
familiar Stone-Geary utility function:
m
U- am Rog(Rm-ym) f af Rog(kf-yf) -~ ay Ro8(Y-7y)
Uf - Bm Rog(Rmdm) t Bf Rog(Rf-df) f gY Rog(Y-ay) (3.2)
wtth a - l- a~i - af
Y
Ry - 1 - ~m - (if
The demand equations in the case of male or female dictatorship are gi-
ven by:
m )
wiRi - wiyi -t- al(Y-wmym-wfYf-Yy) (í - m,f) (3.3
and
f
wiRi - widi f gi(Y-wmdm-rwfdf-dy) ( 1 ~ m,f) (3.4)
respectívely.
Tt f~; Import:~nL to n~~te thac thc~ numher of unknown utility para-
nn,~~.r~; I~; Iwir~, nr; I:ir};r n,; fn hun~;chul~i labor supply models where pre-
fcrrences nrc rr~ireticnted hy a single utilíty functton. Therefore, extra
information is needed to be able to estimate all parameters. A particu-
lar feature oE the data we use is that it does not only contain informa-
tion on the number of hours partners actually work (actual hours), but
it also tells us how many hours each partner would like to work at the
going wage rate (preEerred iiours). With respect to the latter variable
we assume that it is determined exclusively on the basis of the respon-
dent's own preEerences. This data interpretation is supported by the
fact that in the phrasinl; of the question there is no reference at all
to the partner's behavior or preferences. Moreover, partners answer
these questions seliarately, without a possibility of joint decision ma-
king.12
As a result, we liave the following preferred hours equations:
P p
wmRm - wmym f am(Y-wmym-wfyf-yy) f em
wfRt - wfdf ~- Bf(Y-wmdm-wfdf-6y) t ef
(3.5)
(3.6)
where [he supercript p refers to preferred hours.
the
Turning to the interpretation of the actual hours observed in
data, we first note that the utility functions (3.1) and (3.2) are
only well-deEined iE
Rm ~ ym' Q f ~ y f' y~ yy




As is well-known, the y's and d's can be interpreted as subsistence
quantities. We assume that in the household decision making process the
partners respect each other's subsistence quantities, so that the con-
tract curve is based on
"m
U- am Rog(Rm-~m) f af Rog(Rf-~f) t ay Ro8(Y-nY) (3.9)
Uf - E3m Rog(Rm-r~m) t Bf RoR(Rf-nf) f By Rog(Y-nY) (3.10)
where r1m - max(ym,dm), nf - max(yf,df) and ny ~ max(yY,dY).
A practical advantage of this assumptions is that the contract
curve now reduces to a straight line trough both dictatorial poíntsl):
Rf - c0 ~- clRm
with
(3.11)
1) There are no conceptual problems with using more flexible spe-
cifications. A practical complication however is that in general it is
not possible to derive an explicit closed form for the contract curve,
so that in the estimation procedure numerical methods have to be used.13
c
af - Bf wm
1 - am - Bm - wf
(3.12)
~ af am




(see Appendix A for details)
Now we can write the actual hours equations as
~
w 2a - w ~ ~- Y {a f a(6 -a )} f ta
m m m m m m m m
~ l
wfR~~ - wriir f Y {af i- a(Bf-af)f f ef





where the superscript a refers to actual hours. So, for the present spe-
cification, the marginal budget share in the actual hours equation is a
convex combination of the marginal budget shares in the corresponding
male and female dictatorial equations.
If a- 0 we have male dictatorship, if a- 1 we have female dic-
tatorship.
It is easily seen that ( 3.15) and (3.16) can also be obtained
using ( 2.7) and maximizing
U - (1-a)Um f a0f
- vm Rog(km-Tlm) f vf Rog(Rf-nf) f vy kog(Y-ny) (3.17)
s.t. wmRm t wfOf f y- Y
where v - a f a(fS -a )
m m m m
vf - af t a(Bf-af)





which ímplies that for this specification it would be legitimate in ex-
plaining actual hours [o assume that the household's preEerences can be
reprcrtiented hy one Stone-Gi~ary utílity function, even if the spouses
havc~ Jifferent preferences. However, in general the functional form of
thr actuai hours equations obtained by maxímizing ( 2.4) wíll differ from
the Eunctional. form of the preferred hours equations obtained by maximi-
zing Vm and Vf seperately. In that case, employing the traditional model
(based on one utility function) is generally a misspecification.
The error terms em, ef, em en Ef are introduced to account for
omitted variables, optimization errors, etc. In the actual hours equa-
tions the e's may also comprise the effects of institutional restric-
tions.
In order to identify the parameters of both ilm and Uf , as well
as a, one extra restriction on the margínal budget share parameters is
needed. We choose a- R.
Y Y
Assumin~ the error terms to be normally distributed with zero
mean and (unrestricted) covariance matrix E, we estimate equations
(3.i), (3.6), (3.15) and (3.16) jointly using Full Information Maximum
Likelihood.
In the estimation only households are used where both the male
and the female partner work in a paid job for at least 15 hours per
week. The 15 hours cut-off point is dictated by the survey design by
which certain items of information are not collected for people who work
less than 15 hours per week. This sample selectíon rule can be taken
into account appropriately by maximizing the likelihood function.
P P f I (Rm'R f'Rm'R f)
i. - II




Here fl(Rm,Rf,Rm,Rf) is the joint density function of Rm, Rf, Rm and Rf
implied by (3.5), (3.6), (3.15) and (3.16) for the n-th household and
f2(Qm,Rf) is [he joint margínal density function of Rm and Rf for the n-
th household.15
The likelihood (3.21) is maximized using a quasi-Newton algo-
rithm which requires no (analytical) derivatives, as provided by the
NAG-Library (E~4JBF). The (asymptotic) covariance matrix of the maximum
likelihood estimators i s estimated by the inverse of the (numerically
calculated) Hessian of the min-koglikelihood function:
var (8) - (a2RnL(6))-1 ~
aeae' e - e
(3.22)
where 6 denotes the parameters of the model and 6 is the maximum like-
lihood estimate of 6.
Although the estimation of the type of models developed in this
paper requires infurmatton on both actual and preferred hours, it is not
necessary to know the 'exact' number of preferred hours. it is suffi-
cient to know whether the respondent is content with his or her working
time and, if not, whether he or she wants to work fewer or more hours
per week (assuming that the net wage per hour does not change). Ham
(1982) uses [his type oE data. in the case, for example, where both
partners want to work fewer hours than they actually do, the nwnerator








'Phi~ r~,tiul t~; ~~f tln~ I~ [MI:estLmation of the model are summarized
in table 4.1.
Table 4.1. Estimation results












5436 . . .
0.08 10170 . .
-0.05 -0.08 14170 .
-0.13 0.04 0.66 3961
In the first place, we note that the estimated a's, B's and a
fall between zero and une, as they should. As has been noted before, the
utility functions (3.l) and (3.2) are only well-defíned if the observed
quantities exceed the subsistence quantities. We have checked per obser-
vatton point whether these conditions are satisfied; see table 4.2.
1) T is set equal to 168 hours per week. The estimates of (T -Yi)
and (T-S.) ( 1-m,f), however, are independent of the choice of T.
i
2) I)iay,onal elemt~ntti are varfances, off-dial;onal elements are correlation
c~iefffcientti.17
Table 4.2. Percentage observations satisfying regularity conditions
Ym Y f Yy dm df dy
Preferred hours 98 55 98 96 55 70
Actual hours 89 41 100 82 41 89
In view of the restrictive functional forms of the labor supply
equations ímplíed hy the additíve utili[y functions (3.1) and (3.2), the
numbers In tahle 4.2. are rather encouraging.
Although ít is temp[íng [o interpret the estimated a as an indi-
c~~tíon of the relative power of the spouses in the decision regarding
joint labor supply, it should be borne in mind that the results might be
affected by (for male and female partner possibly different) institutio-
nal constraints. Moreover, the estimated standard error of a is relati-
vely large. Therefore we shall abstain from an interpretation of a ín
terms of relative power.
it ts of interest to test whether the ntility functions of both
spo~ises ar~r tii};nífic~~intly dlffcrent. So, we tetit the joint hypothesis:
~ii - Ri i - m, f
i - m, f, y (4.2)
An appropriate test in this case is the Wald testl). On the ba-
sis of the value of tlie Wald statistic (47.7), the null hypothesis of
equal utility functtons is rejected decisively. Subject to the qualifi-
cations oE the model, this result indica[es that the traditional neo-
I) Writiny; (4.1) nn~l (4.2) a~; h(I10) - 0, the Wa1~1 statistlc is
W - h(00)llcov h(00)I -1 h(00) (4.3)
where cov hr, ) ís obtained from the covariance matríx of the ML
estimator of r). W has (asymptotically) a í~Y-distribution with 5
degrees ot freedom. The critical levels for 5i and 2.5i, are 11.1 and
12.8, respectively.18
classical framework, where preferences are represented by a single
ntility ( unctinn, ts too llmited as a descriptíon of the household's
lab~~r r~upply ~lecitiion. Il~irney and McParoy ( l98O) and Brown and Manaer
il~)Iti) i-iimi~ In r:lmllnr ~~nni~ln~:innti.19
5. Concluding remarks
Models of householrl labor supply are usually based on the as-
~;uml,t lon thnl tln~ h„usc~h~riri'~; Irrefcrr~ncev can be represented by a single
~i111ity Innr[I~cn. In thl~; p:cpcr we I„ive deve[oped an empirical model
which s[arts Crom a mure rencral household decision making framework. It
is based on the assumption that partners cooperate and confine them-
selves to Pareto optimal bargaíns.
The estimation results are plausible and a test of the more ge-
neral model against the traditional model supports the more general mo-
del.
Although the speciEications used in the empírical part of the
paper are rather simple, the extension to using more flexible specifica-
tions is straightforward. Indeed, using the concept of shadow wages (see
Section 2), [t ts ict principle possihle to employ specifications for
whic-h no rxpl[clt fr,rm for Ihr~ direct ut[lity Cunction exists. However,
Ilii~ r„inl,~il.~l li,n:il Ininlr,n ul ~:urli mcxle~lti wll l ho rtubvC~rntlrtlly h[};her.20
Ai,i~tnrííx A. r)~~rivatiun ol the contract curve
A~~plytn}; (2.3) tu (3.9) and (3.10) we find that the contract
curve satisftes
, A B Dl , k
(k 2 1) I B C E~ IRm - 0
m f ``D E F} 1`lf
where
A - wm(Rf-af)
B - ~wmwf~ (rxm-(;m) } (R f-af)}
C - wf(am-Bm)
D-~wm{-(1-af)Q1 - afQ2 t afQ3 f(1-af)Q4}
E - ~iwf{-amQl-(1-Bm)Q2 f (1-am)Q3 f B4Q4}
F - Q1Q2 - Q3Q4
with
Q1 - Sf(Y-yy) f BYwfYf
Q2 - am(Y-yy) f aYwmYm
Q3 - Rm(Y-Yy) f BywmYm
Q4 - af(Y-Yy) f aywfyf
Assume that














R~` R 1 A B`-1 D
~ ~n ~ - ~ ~n ~ i
`~~ ;; jQ1 - '~B ~~ ~ `1.:
and
1 1
k- F- (D E) IC U~- jFJ
Then (A.1) can be rewrítten as






After substituttons of (A.2) -( A.ll) into ( A.14) and some straight for-
warcl manipulations ít turns out that k-O. Next, solvtng Rf from
A B1 ~ R ~
(Qm Rf) i 1 m- 0
`B C~ `Rf,
we find




So, (A.l) -(A.ll) defíne two straight ltnes. Their slopes are
-B B2-AC wm ~f-af
cl - C t J CZ --wf, am-Bm
and
d - -B - JftZ-AC - -wm











ri~tili~~~~ t 1 va~ I y.
Th~~ I In~~ 21- -, .~~~ t i,.IQln iv thi~ 1 fne throuKh hoth dlctatorial
iiulntti. AI I liuintti hc~tw~.~~n (an~l includinF) hoth dictat~irial points re-
I,r~ticnt P,iretu uptim.nl nlLucation5. The Line R,f s d0 t dLY.m iti the line
AD ín ftgure 2.1. at which the indífference contours of the male and the
female partner coincide. Clearly, the points on this line are not Pareto
optimal, as the utility level of both partners is minus infinity.23
Appendix B. The data
The model has been estimated for data from a labor mobility sur-
vey in the Netherlands, conducted in the fall of 1982 by the Netherlands
Central Bureau of Statistícs and the Institute for Social Research of
'rtlbury University. The sample has been drawn randomly from the popula-
tton of all households in the Netherlands whose head is between 18 and
65 years of age. The sample contains 1315 households. Within each house-
hold each member oE 18 years or over has been interviewed. As a result
the sample contains 2677 respondents.
For our empirical analysis we only consider households where
both the male and the female partner work in a paid job for at least 15
hours per week. The 15 hours cut-off point is dicta[ed by the survey
design by which certain items of information are not collected for
people who work less than 15 hours per week. As a result, we analyse a
sample of 139 households Eor whom a sufficient amount oE information has
heen collected to be able to estimate the model. Some sample statistics
are presented Ln tahle B.l.




mean s.d. min max
36.0 8.2 0 70
41.9 6.2 20 70




Family non labor income
25.8 8.2 12 50
30.0 9.1 15 50
9.5 1.5 6.3 14.4
17.2 30.1 0 140.6
a) Hours are per week, wage rates are in Dfl. per hour, non labor income
is in Dfl. per week.24
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